SYNERGISTIC SUCCESS: THE POWER OF MENTORSHIP AND REACHING THE
SENIOR LEVELS OF THE U.S. ARMY

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the subject of mentorship and how it relates to career success in the United States Army. The term mentorship is loosely understood and is often mislabeled. This study seeks to explain underlying reasons why there is a lack of African American United States Army officers in the combat arms branches. It attempts to understand the strategic nature of mentorship and its effect on officers. Clear identification and implementation of mentorship at critical times should positively increase the number of African American combat arms officers in the United States Army.

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ABSTRACT

SYNERGISTIC SUCCESS: THE POWER OF MENTORSHIP AND REACHING THE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE U.S. ARMY, by Major Linwood R. Nelson, 86 pages.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the subject of mentorship and how it relates to career success in the United States Army. The term mentorship is loosely understood and is often mislabeled. This study seeks to explain underlying reasons why there is a lack of African American United States Army officers in the combat arms branches. It attempts to understand the strategic nature of mentorship and its effect on officers. Clear identification and implementation of mentorship at critical times should positively increase the number of African American combat arms officers in the United States Army.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

APMS	Assistant Professor of Military Science
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CODA	Commission on Officer Diversity and Advancement
FAPO	Field Artillery Proponency Office
HBCU	Historically Black Colleges and Universities
HRC	U.S. Army Human Resources Command
LOE	Lines of Effort
MMAS	Master of Military Arts and Science
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OEMA	Office of Economic Manpower and Analysis
OPMD	Officer Personnel Management Directorate
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
SOBA	State of Black America
U.S.	United States
USMA	United States Military Academy

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> I think to be frank, one of our problems is I don't have enough white officers mentoring black officers. It doesn't matter what race you are, an officer is an officer is an officer, and what we need to know is why we're not meeting what we believe are proper numbers for our diverse Army.
> — 38th CSA General (Ret) Raymond T. Odierno

Background

Since President Harry S. Truman's signing of Executive Order 9981 (Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces), the United States Army has spearheaded the services in regards to fully integrating African Americans and other minorities in its organizational structure. Political and social factors have stalled its true implementation and as a result, Army black officers have had limited success in reaching the highest levels of the organization. In 2003, the Commanding General of United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command established a Commission on Officer Diversity and Advancement (CODA) to address several racial/ethnic disparities involving officer accessions, branching, assignments, professional development, command opportunities, promotions, and retention (Department of the Army 2014). With today's complex security environment, the Army is leveraging its main resource: people. Diverse thoughts, experiences, and backgrounds are needed in the Army as part of the strategic framework to understand, engage, and work with different cultures around the world. In spite of these efforts, African Americans continue to lack sufficient numbers at the highest levels of the Army. Although, the Army has identified mentoring as a critical component to

increasing diversity within its force, it has yet to find a sustainable strategy to increase the number of black senior leaders.

Included in this study is a review of some of the historical and sociocultural elements that contribute to black officer's non-selection of combat arms, an examination of mentorship, and several recommendations on how the Army can optimize its mentorship efforts in increasing black combat arms officers.

Demographics

Every segment of American society is transforming to account for social and demographic changes. Globalization and technology are having profound effects on the millennial generation and U.S. citizens. Based on the 2010 Census, the U.S. population total is 308 million people of which 14 percent identify as black. Astonishingly, the majority of blacks in the United States or about 55 percent live in the South (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). This trend will continue for the foreseeable future in which the preponderance of blacks who decide to serve in the military will come from the southern states of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. The dark areas in Figure 1 depict the areas having the highest concentration of Black Americans. By 2030, less than half of the U.S. population under age 18 will be non-Hispanic white (Mitchell 2008, 7). This social dynamic will affect the military's organizational culture and deeply impact how the Army recruits and retains talented officers and enlisted personnel.

Figure 1.   Black or African American Population

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, "The Black Population 2010," accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.

According to the FY16 Army Demographics profile, black officers comprise 11 percent of the active duty officer corps, while white officers account for 72 percent. The combat arms branches of infantry, armor, and field artillery fall within the Operations category, which makes up 37 percent of the commissioned officers with blacks serving at 24 percent. Compared with the Force Sustainment category, blacks make up 29 percent, while white officers are 13 percent (U.S. Army 2016). This disparity identifies the imbalance and overrepresentation of black officers in the noncombat arms branches with nearly a third of the black officer population serving in support branches.

<center>Great Migration</center>

Between 1910 and 1970, more than 6 million African Americans migrated from the Southern United States to the urbanized areas in the Northeast, Midwest, and West for equitable economic opportunities (Robinson 2010, 36). Until 1910, more than 90 percent of the African American population lived in the American South. The thirst for equality and freedom from Jim Crow, a policy that mutated from the Black Codes, spurned the movement of 500,000 African-Americans above the Mason-Dixon Line between 1917 and 1918. Northern industries' desperate need for labor and African Americans as an untapped source of labor sparked the Great Migration, for the U.S. during World War I saw an increased need for manufactured goods such as guns, battleships, and steel (Anderson 2016, 42).

The Second Great Migration occurred after the Great Depression between 1940 and 1970, where at least 5 million African Americans in search for industrialized jobs moved to the North and California. Since 1965, a New Great Migration saw African Americans moving back South to states and cities where economic opportunities were best. Primary reasons included the growth of jobs in the South, family ties, and economic difficulties in the Northeastern and Midwestern United States. By 1970, more than 80 percent of African-Americans lived in cities throughout the United States.

<center>Education</center>

Since the end of slavery and during Reconstruction, blacks have been disenfranchised educationally. The Supreme Court ruling of Plessy vs. Ferguson made "separate but equal" the legal cornerstone of segregation in America (Anderson 2016, 67). This decision coupled with the discriminatory policies in the Jim Crow South created

significant disparities in resources for Black Americans. Inadequate textbooks, decrepit buildings, and minimal funding all led to a substandard educational system, which had critical socioeconomic impacts on blacks in the South. Black adults were in no better shape as they lacked the educational skills to access better job opportunities. Black Codes in the South disenfranchised African Americans in education and employment (Robinson 2010, 89). Blacks universally depended on whites for survival and saw limited opportunity for prosperity. For example, by the mid-1940s, more than 60 percent of black adult citizens in South Carolina and Louisiana had no more than a fifth-grade education (Anderson 2016, 71). Massive educational and economic obstacles kept Blacks inferior by design and crushed any hopes of a better life (Robinson, 2010, 36).

All Volunteer Army

By 1973, the Army eliminated the draft and designated the new Army as an all-volunteer force. The effects of Vietnam forced the Army to reassess itself and appeal more to the American people. African Americans recognized the opportunities the Army offered as social and environmental conditions changed. The Army focused on changing its behavior by stressing inclusion and diversity of blacks and women (Mitchell 2008, 3).

By 1982, the percentage of black officers was more than three times the Navy and two times the Marine Corps. In 1986, African Americans constituted 30 percent of the Army, but were concentrated in support roles, and underrepresented in combat arms units (National Research Council 1989, 72). During this time, the Army offered educational and financial incentives to raise the ranks to acceptable levels. African Americans viewed the Army as a second chance opportunity for full citizenship status (Mitchell 2008, 2).

Today, the Army continues to attract African American officers as 11 percent occupy its ranks (U.S. Army 2016).

Army Promotion System

An impediment for the Army that causes the lack of black officers is its promotion system. Unlike civilian organizations, the Army develops and promotes its leaders from within the organization. It operates on an internal personnel system and cannot hire leaders from other organizations or insert leaders at the organizational level. Therefore, if the Army accesses fewer black combat arms officers, it limits the number of black officers available for potential promotion to the senior ranks in the future (Clark 2014, 8).

The Army selects battalion and brigade commanders based off a centralized selection list at HRC. Battalion command is virtually a prerequisite for brigade command. Successful brigade command makes officers competitive for the general officer ranks. The selection system creates a "bubble" in which the lack of selection for command limits the number of officers competitive for the next rank (Clark 2014, 11). For example, 12 African-American officers are selected for battalion command between fiscal years 2011 and 2014 with two officers selected for brigade command in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. The bubble in the system creates four officers over two cohort year groups that will be competitive for general officer (Clark 2014, 11).

Mentorship

Black officers are not reaching the most senior levels of the Army primarily through the lack of mentorship and underrepresentation in the combat arms branches. The

Army recognizes the difficulty and importance of building a diverse force at all ranks to include the senior levels. The CODA study highlighted that mentorship was an important factor critical to increasing the accession of minority officers into combat arms (Department of the Army 2014). Numerous studies have mentioned that the majority of the general officers come from the combat arms branches, predominantly Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery (Department of the Army 2014).

However, the process in growing Army senior leaders is lengthy. Colonel Stephen G. Smith, author of "Achieving Army Senior Leader Racial/Ethnic Balance: A Long Term Approach" outlined in his monograph:

> The desired time to produce a Colonel in the Army is 22 years (plus/minus a year) and the average time it takes to produce a Brigadier General is 26 years. Every year we delay making significant changes to the way we recruit, develop, and retain officers, we add a year to an already major challenge of achieving reasonable racial/ethnic balance. (Smith 2013, 5)

This study examines why there is a lack of black combat arms officers and the role mentorship plays in military service. It also identifies specific actions the Army can utilize in its mentorship efforts to increase the number of African American combat arms officers especially in the field artillery over the next 10 years.

Primary Research Question

Mentorship has played a role in the Army since its inception. Its most successful leaders have emphasized the importance of mentorship and its impact on their careers. It is a foundational component of leader development and a lynchpin in building the next cadre of senior leaders. However, if mentorship is not performed adequately, the Army will have difficulty in retaining talented future leaders. The purpose of this study is to answer the question: Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next

10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?

Secondary Research Questions

The secondary questions to be answered in this thesis are:

1. How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?

2. How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, executable strategy?

3. What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?

These secondary questions address a number of issues, which will lead to answering the primary research question and developing conclusions and recommendations for future research.

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions to discuss in order to frame the research as it applies to the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" Assumptions are ideas or concepts that the researcher believes to be true and are necessary in order to continue with the research. The study identifies the following assumptions:

1. The majority of the Army's general officers come from the combat arms branches.

2. The lack of mentorship and the underrepresentation of black officers in the

combat arms branches limits blacks to senior levels in the Army.

3. The lack of black Field Artillery officers will continue unless there is an institutional fix to address the low number of black combat arms officers.

Definitions of Terms

Combat Arms: Term refers to units and soldiers who close with and destroy enemy forces and provide firepower and destructive capabilities on the battlefield. The included branches and functions are: Air Defense Artillery, Armor/Cavalry, Aviation, Corps of Engineers, Field Artillery, Infantry, and Special Forces.

Commissioning Sources: Refers to all sources of commission for Army officers, including Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, Officer Candidate School (OCS) and direct commissions into the Army.

Direct Commission: An Army program that commissions officers in the Army active or reserve component without a formalized military education, training and development process such as USMA, ROTC or OCS. The Army usually directly commissions individuals with advanced degrees and specialized skills, such as medical specialists, lawyers, and others.

Force Sustainment Category: This functional category includes an integrated Logistics Corps as well as the branches and functional areas associated with resource and Soldier support functions: Integrated Logistics Corps: Transportation Corps, Ordnance and Quartermaster, Logistics Branch; Human Resources, Financial Management, and Acquisition Corps. A part of force sustainment, but separately managed are the Health Services: Army Medical Department (medical, dental, veterinary, nurse, medical

specialist and medical services), Chaplain Corps, and The Judge Advocate General Corps.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU): Refers to those colleges and universities established specifically for black citizens of the United States, mainly during the period of segregated education.

Mentoring: (in America's Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling and evaluating, that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity (Department of the Army 2012, 7-67).

Noncombat Arms: Refers to career management fields and branches of the Army other than combat arms.

Officer Candidate School (OCS): Officer Candidate School was established in 1941 to provide infantry officers for World War II. Today, OCS consists of a demanding fourteen-week course where enlisted soldiers are commissioned as second lieutenants for all sixteen branches of the Army.

Operations Category: This functional category gathers maneuver branches and functional areas that have similar battlefield application or complementary roles. The functional category includes the following branches and functional areas: Infantry, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Chemical, Information Operations, Military Police, Special Operations Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC): A four-year program of classroom instruction, military training and practical leadership experience that commissions officers into both the reserve and active components of the Army.

The ROCKS Incorporated: The ROCKS, Inc. is a non-profit organization comprised of active duty, reserve, retired and former commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, widows and widowers of deceased members, and other uniformed services. The organization provides professional and social interaction and professional development to strengthen the officer corps (The ROCKS Inc. 1974).

United States Military Academy (USMA): The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, is a four year undergraduate military institution founded in 1802, which produced many of the most influential military leaders in American history. USMA educates, trains and develops cadets to become active component Army second lieutenants.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations are existing factors that limit the scope of research and analysis. The primary limitation is time. The current Command and General Staff College academic year limits the research to eight months. Another limitation is the lack of available research on the thesis topic with limited funds to travel to different destinations. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, no in-depth surveys or interviews were used. Other studies largely consisting of MMAS theses and Army War College Monologues have addressed the underrepresentation of blacks in combat arms, such as the Infantry. However, none have directly addressed the lack of black officers in the Field Artillery.

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Delimitations are self-imposed factors that set the boundaries and direct the focal point of the thesis. The researcher limited the study to black male active duty commissioned officers, who are underrepresented in the combat arms branches of infantry, armor, and field artillery. Time and resource constraints limited data collection to secondary sources. All research will be conducted through multiple data sources. These include information provided by official Department of Defense studies and publications, Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC); the Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO), U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Office of Economic Manpower and Analysis (OEMA), and U.S. Army Cadet Command. Even though all the U.S. armed forces describe mentorship, this study will strictly focus on the Army's definition and application of mentorship. No research will be conducted after March 31, 2017 in order to allow sufficient time for analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.

Significance of the Study

This study will attempt to fill a gap in the scholarly literature by proposing recommendations to increase the number of black male combat arms officers in the U.S. Army with a focus on Field Artillery. Over the last 100 years, institutional racism and policies have inculcated a preference for African American officers to serve in noncombat arms related fields.

This thesis also identifies mentorship and its power in influencing African American Army officers to branch combat arms. One area where the Army can improve its efforts is in Field Artillery, one of the Army's primary combat arms branches. Field Artillery has led efforts in incorporating females in the combat arms since the late 1970s.

While not directly maneuver, Field Artillery could serve as a gateway to increasing efforts to build the number of black officers in the combat arms branches.

Chapter Conclusion

The next chapter, chapter 2, discusses how the literature informs answers to the following secondary research questions:

1. How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?

2. How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, executable strategy?

3. What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?

Systematically and sequentially finding answers to the secondary research questions supports and informs the conclusion to the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of African-American military service to the U.S. Army, the aspects of mentorship, and insights to why there is a lack of black combat arms officers.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> In the process of evolution the American negro has not progressed as far as the other sub-species of the human family. As a race he has not developed leadership qualities. His mental inferiority and the inherent weaknesses of his character are factors that must be considered with great care in the preparation of any plan for his employment in war…in the past wars the negro has made a fair laborer, but an inferior technician. As a fighter he has been inferior to the white man even when led by white officers…
> ─ U.S. Army War College Study Memorandum for the Chief of Staff regarding Employment of Negro Man Power in War, November 10, 1925

Chapter Introduction

Answering the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" requires a literature review. The purpose of this literature review is to provide a framework for the parameters of this study. This information will be subsequently analyzed and used to answer the secondary research questions within Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis. The chapter begins with a historical overview of African-American participation in the Army because it traces how the political and social issues within the United States shaped the attitudes and perceptions of black service over time. These psychosocial barriers created a mindset that serving in combat arms is disadvantageous at the junior officer level. This barrier combined with a preference to gain a technical skill associated with the civilian work sector has led to black officers preferring noncombat arms over combat arms.

<u>Black Service in the U.S. Army</u>

Blacks have made significant contributions during all major American wars, for they saw service in the military as a conduit for racial, social, and political progress. Black officers served in noncombat units as chaplains and surgeons. Army service provided a major benefit of educating black enlisted men as thousands learned to read and write in army schools (Dewitt 2010, 7). However, the education and training was only in state militias, and not the standing Army. In the regular Army, the War Department neither trained nor educated African American officers (Dewitt 2010, 8). At the end of the Civil War, black soldiers could serve in four regiments: the 9th and 10th Cavalry along with the 24th and 25th Infantry (Miller 2011, 11). The Buffalo Soldiers and two black regiments served honorably during the Spanish-American War, however, they were relegated to mainly service and support operations.

As part of the nation's mobilization for war during World War I, the federal government issued a "work or fight" order that required every able-bodied person to be employed in key industries needed to wage war or fight as part of the Armed Forces. The increased demand for soldiers gave blacks another opportunity in fighting for advancement toward universal equality. African Americans saw military service as a way to make a living and fulfill the desire to attain social equality even though the Army moved slowly to increase the capacity of black officers. They received no leadership opportunities and transferred from cavalry and infantry to support related functions (Dewitt 2010, 11).

Black leaders wanted black officers leading black soldiers, so the War Department established a ROTC training camp for African Americans at Fort Des

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Moines, Iowa (Dewitt 2010, 9). In spite of the separate training facilities and poor resources, 639 officers were commissioned. These officers consisted of 106 Captains, 329 First Lieutenants, and 204 Second Lieutenants (Franklin and Moss 1994, 327).

Blacks saw extremely limited combat action in World War I due to restrictive Army culture. Senior leaders used racially biased illiteracy tests as confirmation that blacks should be relegated to service-related duties because they lacked the intellectual agility to function in a combat environment (Doward 2007, 32). The tests failed to account for the cultural bias built into separate school systems that provided education for blacks who grew up in the South. Dr. Jennifer D. Keene emphasizes the disparity in test questions between recruits by highlighting "the beta exam given to illiterate recruits pictured an empty tennis court and expected the soldier to draw a net to complete the portrait, while the alpha exam given to literate soldiers tested a soldiers' familiarity with brand name products" (Keene 2002, 77).

Of the 389,000 African American soldiers involved in World War I, only 42,000 were assigned to combat related duties (Doward 2008, 6). As a result of poor morale and institutional racism, Blacks were primarily restricted to noncombat duties in labor intensive units. In the combat units, African Americans received substandard housing, training and equipment. Often, they were the lowest in priority, since they represented three percent of the Army's total combat strength (Doward 2007, 41). Because of these shortages and hardships, African Americans gravitated towards the support units where more supplies were available.

During World War I, African Americans approximately made up one-thirtieth of the Army's combat forces and one-third of its laboring units (Chambers 1987, 223). Dr.

Jennifer D. Keene identifies in her work that "racially motivated policies were designed to keep black soldiers in the rear unloading boxes instead of manning the trenches along the front" (Keene 2002, 82). Even though several reforms were enacted during World War I, little progress was made in building and using African American combat units. Equally, discerning was the backlash African Americans received if they showed any intellectual prowess. Black males were expected to remain reserved, docile, and subservient (Doward 2007, 9).

By 1940, 5,000 African American soldiers remained in an army of 230,000 officers and enlisted men (Miller 2011, 15). As the Army entered the interwar period, African American attitudes towards military service waned because of the institutionalized racism. Blacks fought and died for a country that did not afford them the rights and freedoms privy to white citizens (Miller 2011, 15). The unequal treatment in the military coupled with the Jim Crow laws in the former Confederate States began to negatively impact the black community (Doward 2007, 10). Blacks in America were marginalized, socially, politically, and economically.

In spite of the oppressive system, African Americans remained patriotic and continued to serve their country. Blacks believed that military service would justify political, social, and economic equality. African American officers made significant strides during the WWII era. Blacks continued to serve, but not lead. Army policy limited black officers to service related assignments, for they were prohibited from duty in supervisory positions over White Americans (Doward 2008, 13). The policy stated that "Except for medical officers and chaplains, senior Negro officers will not be assigned to a unit having white officers, nor in any case will white officers be commanded by Negro

officers" (Morehouse 2000, 28). This presented a barrier against professional military careers for black officers. Army policy mirrored the larger civilian society as black and white officers had limited social interaction. Separate and unequal treatment for blacks reinforced misguided perceptions when it came to assignments and leadership capability. President Truman's Executive Order 9981 stifled racism by integrating the armed forces. African American officers and enlisted men saw this order as a step in the right direction for equality. In spite of the slow pace, the Army was the first of the armed services to implement the executive order, and ushered in its first black general officer with Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.

The Korean War experienced the integration of the army after President Truman signed the executive order 9981 in 1948. With the order taking effect, the Army "integrated" its units by placing smaller sized African American units into larger white units. Even though they remained pure, four black units consisting of the 24th Infantry Regiment, the 77th Engineer Company, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 512th Military Police Company were all placed under Eighth Army in Korea complying with the War Department's Army Circular 124 (Miller 2011, 16).

To compensate for a manpower shortage General Matthew Ridgway advocated for black infantryman, while General Douglas MacArthur stressed the Army's segregated status quo (Doward 2008, 16). As Ridgway integrated his forces, they did not disappoint. The change in military culture turned out better than most expected. In a 1951 study called Project Clear, over 85 percent of white officers reported that black soldiers performed about the same in battle as their white counterparts and that integrated units were more effective than segregated ones (Doward 2008, 16).

When the Vietnam War began, the Army had the highest percentage of African American officers. It was also a time of two firsts: the first war and time in American history in which the U.S. armed forces were fully integrated. While limited parity existed in the military, black officers still viewed the military as an opportunity for socio-economic advancement. However, the black community's perception of military service started to change after a government study in 1971 reported an almost two percent disparity in combat deaths. African American deaths due to hostile action was 13.2 percent compared to 11.9 percent of all Soldiers serving in Vietnam (Miller 2011, 18). Political outcry from black civic leaders caused the Army to reduce the number of African Americans in combat arms unit and transfer them to combat service support units (Miller 2011, 18).

Even though numbers were increasing for black officers, they were still assigned to non-career enhancing assignments, effectively limiting any opportunity to reach the senior levels of the Army (Dewitt 2010, 15). Mediocre assignments forced blacks to work twice as hard with abysmal results. With slow promotion rates and limited opportunities for advancement, blacks viewed Army service as short term. African American officers worked extremely hard and left the service after their first term with the mindset that their talents were better served elsewhere in the civilian sector. This perception remains today as blacks do not see the benefit of serving in combat arms branches. The risk to injury or death in combat arms is too high especially if one sees military service as a stepping stone to a civilian job.

In the 1980s, the U.S. economy switched from an industrial to a service economy. Highly educated workers benefited from technical skills as computer-based technologies

increased (Alexander 2011, 50). Combined with the loss of manufacturing jobs in inner cities, the black community viewed attaining a skill to remain competitive in the civilian sector as more important rather than continued military service. Socioeconomic progress continues to motivate black officers and soldiers instead of patriotic service. Attaining technical skills to increase their earning potential in the civilian sector remains the primary factor for African Americans. The Army increased its efforts at HBCUs after ROTC units deactivated their programs at non-HBCUs following Vietnam protests (Dewitt 2010, 17). In 1996, nearly 75 percent of all African American officers commissioned in the armed forces matriculated from HBCUs, while the Army commissioned about 46 percent of black officers from HBCUs (Dewitt 2010, 19).

<center>The Mentorship Process</center>

The word mentor traces its roots back several thousand years ago to Greek mythology. The wise and trusted counselor Odysseus chose for his son Telemacus (Telemachus), according to legend was the goddess Athene, who disguised herself as a male in the form of Mentes (Mentor) (Bryant 2009, 5). Several studies have argued that mentorship and leader development are mutually exclusive, however, mentorship is a critical enabler of leader development (Cox 2009, 99). Without it, leader development becomes ineffective and successful leaders like General Eisenhower and General Marshall fail to optimize their full potential.

The Army identifies mentoring as "the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect" (Department of the Army 2012, 7-67). This process can be informal or formal, but the critical aspect is that the relationship occurs

over a period of time. Mentorship affects personal development as well as professional development. It enhances interpersonal skills as well as technical and tactical competence (Department of the Army 2012, 7-67). Mentoring is a continuous process that evolves for the duration of an officer's career. It begins before commissioning as a cadet, during an officer's career, and post military service.

Because of its importance in professional development, officers need a clear understanding of what exactly mentorship is and how it contributes to leader development. In Robert Harney's thesis, "Development of a Formal Army Officer Mentorship Model for the Twenty-First Century," he identifies six reasons why the Army needs a formalized mentorship program. He cited several reasons such as mentoring is important to leader development, it contributes to decisions to stay in the military, and should begin before the first assignment (Harney 2000, 75).

Mentorship is beneficial to the Army. A study conducted by the Army Research Institute identified seven major benefits associated with mentorship: career satisfaction, compensation, job satisfaction, promotion, pay satisfaction, career mobility, and promotion (Livingston 2010, 18). Even corporate America has identified the power of mentorship especially for minorities. David Thomas highlights mentorship as he describes a "two-tournament system" among corporate America (Thomas 2001, 1). In his research, Thomas found that whites reach the upper levels of management at a faster rate than blacks. Years stuck in middle management cause many minorities to become frustrated and leave the organization in search of better opportunities, except for a few. Those who stayed had a strong network of mentors, who enabled these few individuals to transcend into the executive levels of the organization (Thomas 2001, 1). Although, most

officers in the Army know about mentorship, many confuse its definition and application, as it relates to other leaders within organizations.

A specific challenge, especially in the Army is that officers confuse the word "mentor" when using it as a noun or a verb. Many combine the actions meaning of a mentor with the individual who is a mentor to others (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 1). Even though numerous authors have written on the topic of mentorship, most have not capitalized on the benefits of it. According to a study conducted by David Lyle and John Smith, junior officers have a 29 percent chance of being selected early to the rank of Major when they serve under a high-performing mentor (Lyle and Smith 2014, 232). While some protégés fail to recognize mentorship at its core, some individuals who act as mentors do not possess the traits to successfully fulfill the role (Livingston 2010, 10). Their failure in understanding mentorship negatively impacts the organization.

Mentorship is a tool that promotes positive leader development. It consists of ten behaviors that enables a mentor to develop a protégé's identity, competence, and effectiveness (Adams 1997, 5). It requires a foundation of trust as well as time and effort from both parties. Many officers view mentorship as insignificant because they fail to understand its effectiveness (Reyes 2006, 10). This unconscious bias prevents the mentoring relationship from forming in the first place and adversely affects black officers.

Mentor/Protégé Relationship

There are three primary ways to form mentoring relationships: relations initiated by the mentor, relationships initiated by the protégé, and those initiated by either the mentor or the protégé (Livingston 2010, 31). The relationship between the mentor and

protégé can also take one of three forms: superior, peer, and subordinate (Bircher 2016, 2). The most common relationship is in the traditional sense where the mentor is superior to the subordinate. Peer mentors provide an outlet among equals without fear or retribution where individuals can share best practices, successes, and explore ideas (Bircher 2016, 2). The final relationship is subordinate to superior otherwise known as supportive mentoring. This occurs when a mentor does not outrank the mentee, but has extensive knowledge and experience (Department of the Army 2012, 7-68).

Protégés have the responsibility to be proactive and seek out mentors. They should seize the initiative and approach mentors who can professionally develop them and contribute to their personal growth as an Army officer. Mentorship is inherent in leader development as it promotes communication and team-building skills improving organizational performance.

Barriers to Effective Mentorship

Effective mentorship takes trust and time. It must develop, grow, and sustain itself over the life of an officer's career. Otherwise the relationship will stifle. Although, the Army defines mentorship in its doctrine, not all types are effective. Even at the pre-commissioning level, some are formal, while others are informal. Irving Smith describes the difference in mentorship between ROTC and USMA cadets. He analyzes that ROTC cadets receive much of their understanding of the Army from contracted civilian personnel while USMA cadets received their exposure from a hand selected cadre of active duty officers. This difference creates a disparity in the quality of exposure and experience for cadets commissioned in ROTC versus cadets at USMA (Smith 2010, 40).

Time is critical to forming successful relationships especially when it comes to mentorship. In order to keep the relationship alive, the mentor must adequately meet the needs of the protégé through guidance and listening, otherwise, the mentor likely will not fulfill the role. In turn, the protégé must be willing to meet the mentor halfway by listening and digesting the guidance and advice. Mentors impart knowledge and protégés willingly seek it (Cox 2009, 102). Both parties must strike a balance and realize that there is a degree of trust between both the mentor and protégé.

Generational gaps are another barrier to effective mentorship. Generation X, identified as persons born after 1964 but before 1982, communicate differently than the millennial generation (Livingston 2010, 30). The advances in technology and rise of social media has invigorated a new form of communication that senior leaders must understand if they want to connect with the younger generation.

Cross Race Mentoring

Numerous studies have argued that similarities in race could reinforce and promote mentoring relationships. Individuals are more likely to stay in an organization when they have mentors who look "like them." Carrie Kendrick identified in her study, *African American Officers' Role in the Future Army*, that 90 percent of white officers reported in a survey that they "strongly agree" with the statement "African Americans are more likely to choose other African Americans as mentors" (Kendrick 1998, 39). While many scholars agree that mentorship increases the prospects of a successful career, same race mentors may not be advantageous to the mentoring relationship. Lyle and Smith found that positive interactions with high performing mentors with same race protégés was only statistically significant for whites (Lyle and Smith 2014, 254).

Having a black senior mentor could slightly improve the number of black combat arms officers, but a white mentor will have a more substantial effect on increasing the numbers of African Americans in the combat arms. Additionally, the disproportionate representation of black officers in combat arms presents a dilemma. The pool of African American senior mentors is limited due to the low number of black combat arms officers who can potentially serve as mentors. This reality shows the importance of cross race mentoring. Junior African American officers must actively seek out positive role models and mentors regardless of race (Bryant 2009, 22). Mentorship will increase the probability of success within the Army and reinforce career job satisfaction. This mode of thinking applies to all officers, not just African American. In a white male majority Army, mentorship should cross the domains of race, gender, and culture.

One significant obstacle to cross-race mentoring is the issue of race itself. Trust is better established when white mentors acknowledge race as a potential barrier. David Thomas highlights the concept of "protective hesitation," where both parties refrain from raising touchy issues (Thomas 2001, 8). This mindset can cripple a mentoring relationship and cause it to wither away. Discussing sensitive topics enhances a mentoring relationship, for it enables leaders to transcend race and appreciate the value of each individual.

Our adaptive unconscious enables humans to jump to conclusions by aiding decision making (Gladwell 2005, 11). This concept affects judgment especially in a professional environment. The issue arises in cross race mentorship. In Malcolm Gladwell's book, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, he coins a term called "thin splicing," which allows individuals to decipher large sets of data and draw a

conclusion in a short period of time (Gladwell 2005, 23). Thin splicing plays a role in the ability to form relationships. Overcoming this bias is important in cross race mentoring because humans associate certain words to people or events. Gladwell describes the racial Implicit Association Test, which measures immediate, autonomic associations before an individual has had time to think (Gladwell 2005, 84).

Despite their findings, Lyle and Smith describe the mentoring relationship in their study in terms of battalion commanders mentoring company commanders. They reference quarterly counseling and officer evaluation reports as formal components to the mentor/protégé relationship (Lyle and Smith 2014, 232). While one can view this relationship as mentoring, the battalion commanders are in the rating chain of company commanders. The perceived notion of favoritism could spread among the several company commanders as battalion commanders subjectively evaluate their subordinates. Arguably, this is more counseling than mentoring, and provides a prime example of how one can confuse the two.

The Army has defined mentoring in its doctrine, although, most have difficulty understanding mentorship, and frequently intermingle the concepts of coaching, counseling, and mentoring. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, defines coaching as "the development technique used for a skill, task, or specific behaviors" (Department of the Army 2012, 7-63). Coaching involves some considerable knowledge or technical skills a mentor can pass along to a protégé. This relationship best describes mentoring. In this case, a mentor or one with more experience, usually will serve as a supervisor to a protégé in the same branch. A good example is a battalion commander mentoring a company commander.

The battalion commander has more experience, and can provide guidance to the company commander on task performance, as the former is in the best position to observe the latter. The mentoring from the battalion commander should assist the company commander with professional and personal growth (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 3). A mentor, on the other hand, would not supervise specific tasks, and be in a position to observe the protégé's daily performance. The mentor would focus on the protégé's long term development and potential (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 3). A mentor would assist with potential assignments that support the protégé's personal and professional goals. Coaching focuses on the present and the completion of specific skills or task performance (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 4). On the other hand, the Army uses counseling for assessment and feedback for past performance.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, defines counseling as "the process used by leaders to guide subordinates to improve performance and develop their potential" (Department of the Army 2012, 7-61). The Army conducts three types of counseling: event, performance, and professional growth. Event counseling deals with a specific event or occurrence. Performance counseling focuses on a subordinate's duty performance during a specific period. Every officer and noncommissioned officer receives an evaluation report that provides feedback on task performance during a period of time. Finally, professional growth counseling focuses on personal or organizational goals.

To add confusion, all three concepts are related. Counseling is a part of coaching, and coaching is a part of mentoring (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 4). Figure 2 explains the relationship of coaching, counseling, and mentoring through time. Counseling focuses on

past performance. Coaching looks at the present state, and mentoring views future potential (Thomas and Thomas 2010, 4). Raters and immediate supervisors have the responsibility of coaching and counseling their subordinates, while mentors focus on future potential. Mentors should preferably be outside the chain of command to reduce the perception of favoritism, especially as the Army has returned to a box-check evaluation system.

Figure 2.   Leadership Tools Compared over Time

Source: Ted Thomas, Ph.D, and Jim Thomas, *Mentoring Coaching and Counseling: Toward a Common Understanding* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), 4.

Examples of Effective Mentoring

The Army understands the importance of mentorship and its impact on a successful career. Without it, some of the Army's most successful officers would have plateaued and not reach the senior levels of the service. Officers such as General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., General Dwight E. Eisenhower, and General Colin Powell all received mentorship and were able to shape the Army as well as the world.

General Davis, the first African American general officer would not have been successful without the mentorship of Major Charles Young. He provided sound advice to the young Davis and assisted him in passing the commission test for second lieutenant (Bryant 2009, 8). Young provided helpful assistance to Davis as he navigated the segregated Army. He advised Davis on what assignments to take and how to interact with other officers. If Davis received no mentoring from Young, he never would have risen up the ranks to become the first African American general officer. His military success was shaped by Major Charles young's mentorship.

Many scholars have mentioned the relationship and mentorship of Fox Conner to General Dwight Eisenhower. Conner coached Eisenhower on the study of terrain and history during their time in Panama. Conner's intervention and influence in enabling Eisenhower to attend CGSC at Fort Leavenworth was a prime example of the mentorship Eisenhower received. His career would have stalled after he published a controversial article that displeased the Chief of Infantry (Cox 2009, 101). Fox Conner knew that Eisenhower needed to graduate from CGSC as it provided opportunities for career enhancing assignments. If Eisenhower had not received proper mentorship from Conner, he would not have risen to become a five-star General.

A final example of successful mentorship is the relationship between General Colin Powell and Frank Carlucci. As part of Caspar Weinberger's team, Carlucci helped Powell navigate the shark infested waters of Washington DC politics. On multiple occasions, Carlucci counseled and mentored Powell on how to properly advise senior officials (Powell and Perisco 1995, 294). If Colin Powell received limited mentoring

from Frank Carlucci, he would not have risen to be the country's first black chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the nation's first black Secretary of State.

<div align="center">Army Mentorship Initiatives</div>

The Army has received mixed results with its mentorship initiatives, especially its formal mentorship programs. Several scholars argue that mentoring should be mandatory in the Army. Some programs have been effective such as the mentorship program at USMA. Others have fizzled out. For mentoring purposes, the Army has invested considerable effort in programs at USMA, but not ROTC (Harney 2000, 2). In Clark's study, he analyzed the formalized mentor program at USMA, which sought initiatives to increase the number of African American officers in the Infantry and Armor branches. His analysis uncovered a 91 percent probability that African American mentors affected branching preferences toward Infantry and Armor over a five-year period (Clark 2014, 21). An OEMA survey reported the positive impact mentors had on male African American USMA cadets in 2013, as 88 percent acknowledged the influence mentors had on their selection to Infantry or Armor branch (Clark 2014, 21). This success story understands the importance of mentorship in USMA cadets as the Army seeks to increase the number of African American combat arms officers. Other programs have had limited luck.

In 1999, senior Army leaders tasked Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with piloting a mentor program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2026 students at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) were assigned mentors that consisted of retired brigade and battalion commanders (Livingston 2010, 33). The program was evaluated based on student exposure to their mentor, frequency of mentoring occurring,

and benefits of a formalized mentor program. The pilot program produced dismal results. Seventy-five percent of the focus groups admitted that formal mentoring provided little to no value and hindered more than it helped (Livingston 2010, 35). Due to negative feedback, the program ended in 2002. Students reported that they received more mentorship from the non-mentor faculty, than by the contract mentors (Livingston 2010, 37).

<div align="center">Rocks Inc.</div>

The ROCKS, Inc. is a global non-profit organization that began in 1974. It is named after Brigadier General Roscoe Conklin Cartwright, otherwise known as "Rock," who was the first black Field Artilleryman promoted to Brigadier General. Its first chapter began in Washington, DC, but has steadily grown to over 15 chapters with a membership of over 1150 members. The primary mission of ROCKS, Inc. is providing scholarship assistance for ROTC cadets, professional development, and mentorship among active duty, reservists, and retired officers of the United States Army. Additionally, a secondary mission involves assisting its members with transitioning into the civilian sector.

Traditionally, the ROCKS formulated as an outlet for reassurance and support for African American officers during their tenure at the Command and General Staff College. In the 1960s, black officers needed an organization where they could exchange professional information and dialogue amidst racial tensions in the United States (Doward 2008, 46).

The ROCKS, Inc. is the largest professional military officers' organization with a majority African-American membership. Colin Powell, a retired General and former

Secretary of State for the United States, credited ROCKS for looking out for him during his career and believed its mentorship efforts could serve as a model to the rest of the African American community (Powell and Perisco 1995, 161). The ROCKS organization considers mentorship a cornerstone for its members. Although the majority of its members are African American, ROCKS welcomes all officers regardless of branch or color. It is one of the Army mentoring programs that has demonstrated success by providing the necessary tools for its members to become effective mentors and mentees.

The Army Mentorship Program

In July 2005, the Army created a web-based mentorship program to assist Soldiers in establishing formal and informal mentoring relationships. Additionally, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 produced a mentorship handbook, which provided advice on mentoring, an individual development action plan, and a mentorship agreement (Bryant 2009, 19). Individuals had the option of choosing the type of mentoring relationship they desired such as face-to-face or virtual one-on-one.

The program was open to numerous audiences with access to Army Knowledge Online (AKO) such as Active and Reserve Component Soldiers, their family members, retirees, cadets, and contractors. Users would register for the program, create a profile, and have the option of searching for mentors or mentees from outside the chain of command. While the formal online mentoring forum had the best of intentions, it was difficult to navigate and not user friendly. The technological mentorship program flopped as less than one percent of the almost two million AKO users access the mentorship web page (Livingston 2010, 39).

<center>Organizational Culture</center>

Edgar Schein analyzes culture using three different levels: Artifacts, Espoused Values, and Basic Underlying Assumptions. The definitions of each level and their relationship to each other are shown in figure 1. The Artifacts are the actions or symbols displayed by a group that reflect their group identity viewed externally by others. In other words, these are visible processes. This includes visible behavior of the group and routine behavior designated as acceptable by the organization (Schein 2010, 24). Espoused Values are the philosophies of a group that are based on basic underlying assumptions and shared experiences of the group form the foundation that these values build upon (Miller 2011, 22). These values lead to secondary assumptions by the group, which create the ultimate source of action for the group. Underlying Assumptions are feelings, perceptions or thoughts shared by a group that can influence individuals within that group. These assumptions coalesce over time as individuals within a group share similar results and experiences (Schein 2010, 28).

The most essential issue for leaders, therefore, is understanding the deeper levels of a culture and how to identify personal unconscious bias towards their own culture. Once leaders mitigate these biases and question their assumptions, they must learn how to deal with the cognitive dissonance that is unleashed when those levels are challenged. (Schein 2010, 144).

Figure 3.   Levels of Culture

Source: Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010).

Army Culture

The U.S. Army has existed for over 200 years and continues to have steadfast core values that reinforce the bond between the American people. The Army remains one of the nation's most respected institutions and has within itself, a common framework and expectations regarding behavior, discipline, and teamwork (Mitchell 2008, 14). Contrary to popular belief, the Army operates out of the ideology of "assimilationist pluralism." Even though multiple subgroups within the Army are acknowledged, the final goal is that they are inculcated into the dominant group (Edelstein 2005, 23). In other words, the Army recruits people from all walks of life, but the expectation is that you conform to the customs and intricacies unique to the Army. Military culture emphasizes

teamwork and selfless service with a primary focus on a mission. Strategic leaders within the Army continue to influence and shape Army culture through policy. This top-down approach not only impacts recruitment and retention of American civilians, but reinforces the trust between the Army and the American people.

Black Culture

Numerous studies from the Army and across the Department of Defense have focused their efforts on black officer motivations and career satisfaction. In spite of the economic and intellectual capital spent, many have yet to realize that blacks see the world differently than other racial groups (Smith 2010, 1). In Remo Butler's study, "Why Black Officers Fail?" He highlighted that differences in understanding culture breeds misconceptions that could interfere with sound judgment (Butler 1996, 4). It is no secret that blacks and whites in the U.S. exhibit different behaviors with regards to dress, music, and social events. Since 1973, the National Urban League has released its annual State of Black America (SOBA) that addressed pertinent issues within the Black communities in the U.S. across seven different categories: economics, employment, education, health, housing, criminal justice, civic participation.

To address these issues, the Army must focus its attention to influencers at the community level. James Smith highlighted in his study that black parents adversely affected Black youth's propensity to serve based on political and social conditions during the Global War on Terror. He determined that many African Americans aligned with the Democratic Party, and their anti-war rhetoric negatively shaped Black parent's views of the military (Smith 2006, 54). A second main influencer in the black community is the church itself.

Since the end of slavery, the black community has relied on the church as a major institution to drive social and political change (Griggs 2010, 164). For example, family members, religious leaders, and local politicians can all play an influential role in supporting recruitment efforts (White 2009, 12).

The church remains a staple in the black community. According to a 2010 Pew Research report, 61 percent of African-Americans admit that churches have assisted in addressing numerous problems within the community (Pew Research Center 2010). While the church has garnered support from Blacks as far as solving problems, the government ranked the lowest. 73 percent of African Americans said that the government offers little help in solving problems for black families (Pew Research Center 2010). An even more startling statistic is that blacks gave no credit to themselves as problem solvers, for 61 percent admitted to not helping much within the community (Pew Research Center 2010).

In Jabari Miller's thesis, "The Mentorship Course of Action: Increasing African American Interest in the Maneuver Branches," he analyzed African American culture using Schein's model depicted in Figure 4 (Miller 2011, 37). Miller concluded in his study that the underlying assumption of why there is such a low interest from blacks in the combat arms is because those branches do not lead directly to a technical skill used to prepare one properly for a successful civilian career.

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┌─────────────────────────────┐
│          Artifacts          │
│     Few African American    │
│       Cadets choose         │
│     maneuver branches       │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              ▲
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        Espoused Values          │
│  •  The Army is a conduit to another │
│     career rather than a career unto │
│                itself           │
│  •  Sustainment branches better │
│     prepare one for a civilian career │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
         │              ▲
         ▼              │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│   Basic Underlying Assumptions  │
│  •  Social Approval of career choice │
│  •  No redeeming civilian value in │
│     Maneuver branches           │
│  •  Maneuver branches are more  │
│     dangerous                   │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 4.   African American Culture Model

Source: Jabari Miller, "The Mentorship Course of Action: Increasing African American Interest in the Maneuver Branches" (Master's Thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 37.

Cultural Assimilation Issues

Civilian and military cultures share several characteristics, however in some areas they are distinctly different. Civilian culture emphasizes individuality and in the business world, dividends. At certain points, cultures collide based off of different angles and perspectives. These "contact zones" are locations of conflict and potential violence due to asymmetrical power relations (Edelstein 2005, 27). Failure to understand the contact zones potentially creates conditions for misconceptions. While normally a place of contestation and struggle, contact zones could also serve as sites of mutual respect and

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dialogue (Edelstein 2005, 27). Black junior officers collide with Army culture in a contact zone, often failing to assimilate with negative results.

African American junior officers suffer from "relative deprivation," which is a term coined by sociologist Samuel Stouffer (Gladwell 2013, 77). Malcolm Gladwell analyzes this concept in his book *David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants*, where individuals form negative impressions by comparing themselves to others in the broadest context possible (Gladwell 2013, 78). Gladwell further applies relative deprivation to education and describes a theory known as the "Big Fish—Little Pond Effect." This concept states that the more elite an educational institution is, the worse a student feels about their own academic ability compared to the other students (Gladwell 2013, 80).

Black officers encounter this effect as it relates to performance in the early years of commissioned service. Because of the large culture shock, black combat arms officers are little fish in a big pond. African American junior officers in a white male dominated environment experience relative deprivation; and without proper guidance or mentorship, serve their initial commitment and leave the service.

Because the Army promotes from within a closed personnel system, performance and mentoring are significant components that determine an officer's capability to serve at the next higher level (Dewitt 2010, 35). To capitalize on the short time in the service, black officers feel it is in their best interest to acquire a technical skill before exiting the military. It makes logical sense to maximize your competitiveness in the civilian world by choosing a noncombat arms branch such as those in the force sustainment category that readily transfer over to the civilian work sector.

Black Underrepresentation in the Combat Arms

According to the Action Plan to Address Disparate Trends in Officer Talent Management, black officers are underrepresented in the combat arms branches of Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery with representation at six percent (Department of the Army 2014). The perception is that blacks are more likely to choose a noncombat arms branch because these skills transfer easily into the civilian sector. This occupational segregation results in limited black officers choosing combat arms.

Occupational Segregation

In Emmett E. Burke's study, "Black Officer Under-representation in Combat Arms Branches," he identifies occupational segregation as one of the primary reasons why the combat arms branches lacked black officers (Burke 2002, 8). Martin J. Watts, Deputy Director at the Center of Full employment and Equity at the University of Newcastle, Australia, studied occupational segregation in the U.S. Armed Forces. He stated, "occupational segregation is said to exist when gender/race groups are differently distributed across occupations than is consistent with their overall shares of employment, irrespective of the nature of job allocation." (Watts 2001, 50).

Through Burke's research, he found that even though black officers comprised over 11 percent of commissioned officers in the Army, 61 percent served in non-combat arms occupations and 39 percent served in combat arms. Even more disconcerting was that Army combat arms officers comprised 56 percent of all officers in the Army (Burke, 2002, 8). The disparity is even more pronounced in the enlisted ranks, as whites comprise 50 percent of operations compared to blacks who make up 21 percent. In the force

sustainment category, whites encompass 17 percent of its ranks, while blacks constitute 46 percent (U.S. Army 2016).

Jobs in the Civilian Sector

Employers are often attracted to officers with prior military experience more for their leadership skills and work ethic than for their affiliation with a specific branch of the military. Black officers serve in the Armed Forces to gain a skill with the perception that they would become more competitive in the civilian work sector. During the Jim Crow era, black civic leaders such as Booker T. Washington advocated that African Americans gain economic advancement by learning a skill or trade (Doward 2007, 12).

Prior to 1970, blacks found manageable wages in manufacturing jobs. African American blue collar workers that lacked formal education could earn a decent wage in industrial employment close to home (Alexander 2011, 50). Blacks in the military saw a technical skill as an economic asset in the civilian world. Ronald Clark's thesis found that 62 percent of the individuals he surveyed reported that African American officers select support branches more readily than combat arms branches (Clark 2000, 23). His respondents included Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) students, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) students, and General Officers.

African American officers gain a skill and then leave the service in order to remain competitive for employment in the civilian sector. In Remo Butler's study, he found that 72 percent of the Black officers voluntarily left the Army before attaining the rank of Major (Butler 1996, 12). African American officers continue to this day in leaving the service after this initial service obligation is completed. For all commissioned officers regardless of commissioning source, this obligation is eight years.

<center>Commissioning Sources</center>

Historically, the Army has commissioned officers from four components. These sources are the United States Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Direct Commissioning. The largest number of black officers are commissioned through ROTC. Over half of the black officers commissioned through ROTC are from Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). These institutions of higher learning provide the largest number of Black officers in the Army (Burke 2002, 6). Since 1970, HBCUs have produced the majority of African American Army officers. Over the last 20 years, the Army has increased the number of black officers commissioned from OCS (Dewitt 2010, 30).

<center>Education</center>

Black civic leaders argued different views when it came to education and economics. Booker T. Washington pressed for blacks to focus on labor intensive industrial education, which reinforced the mindset that blacks were only suited for positions of service and labor within the nation's workforce (Doward 2007, 12). On the other hand, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois differed with Washington in that he believed economic advancement could come from higher educational learning where social and political rights were guaranteed for African Americans. However, segregation in schools created more obstacles for blacks as they sought equal social and economic opportunity.

Research has proven the psychological impacts done to black children based on the "separate but equal" Plessy decision (National Research Council 1985, 80). A report conducted by the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education found that educational

<center>41</center>

disenfranchisement begins early in a child's education as K-12 educational programs fail to adequately prepare black children for the rigors of higher education (Dewitt 2010, 27). Segregated schooling has a negative impact on race relations and presents an additional barrier for black officers in the Army.

African American students gain admittance to college, but fail to graduate due to poor academic performance in their studies or lack of funding (Dewitt 2010, 27). Dropping out of college limits the pool of eligible African American cadets who could potentially branch combat arms. This problem exists not only in predominantly white institutions, but also HBCUs. In 2006, two thirds of African American students at 24 HBCUs did not earn a degree, according to a Journal of Higher Education report (Dewitt 2010, 28). Studies have shown that black pupils who attend schools with white students, compared to segregated schools have better social interaction with whites, higher test scores, and graduate from college (National Research Council 1985, 80).

<u>Women in the Field Artillery</u>

Women have served in the U.S. armed forces unofficially dating back to the Civil War. Since the late 1970s, official Army policy authorized women to serve in the Field Artillery, however, they were assigned only to missile units and headquarter units above brigade level. In 2013, the direct combat exclusion policy was rescinded enabling women to serve in battalion-size or smaller combat units. Field Artillery was one of the first combat arms branches to integrate women into its combat units at the battalion level. The intent of using Field Artillery as a vanguard was to minimize the culture shock of women serving in predominantly male combat arms units. Senior leaders sought to integrate

women in combat units at the tactical level with Field Artillery first, followed by

Infantry, Armor, and Special Forces.

Chapter Conclusion

The review of the literature provides insight into answering the secondary

research questions. It provided a historical analysis of African American officers'

military service over the last 100 years. Additionally, the review of literature deciphered

the aspects of mentorship and some of the barriers that circumvent its effectiveness.

Understanding both of these variables will lead to answering subsequent research

questions. The answers to the remaining secondary research questions will be presented

in the course of chapter 4. Chapter 3, will outline the research methodology for this study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Inclusion is when you have a synergistic relationship of people who are historically under-represented in positions where they can weigh in on the current and future operations of the organization. Inclusivity means having those diverse faces, those diverse perspectives at high levels of the organization.

—Warren Whitlock,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Diversity and Leadership

Chapter Introduction

The researcher will use several methods to answer the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" as well as the secondary research questions that shape this study. Those methods include a review of literature, development of an operational approach, and application of evaluation criteria. Answering the secondary research questions will lead to answering the primary research question.

This research begins with a qualitative meta-analysis and review of literature. Next, the secondary research questions will be researched and addressed in a step-by-step-approach, which provides structure during analysis. Then, a set of evaluation criteria based on the secondary research questions will be developed to assist in identifying the best answer to the primary research question. Finally, based on the application of the evaluation criteria, a conclusion will be drawn and the primary research question answered. Based on the research findings and the answer to the primary research

question, the last step will be drawing conclusions and recommending a direction for future research.

Operational Approach

An operational approach, which includes identifying a desirable end state and objectives organized along lines of effort, answers the secondary research question, "What tasks should the Army do in such an event and over what timeframe?" As outlined in *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools*, an operational approach describes how to "change current conditions to the desired future conditions" and is not meant to be a "developed plan of action or course of action" (Kem 2012, 52). The disparities that arise when comparing current conditions and future end state serve as the starting point to create lines of effort (LOE). LOEs constitute the activities that must be accomplished in order to shape the current conditions in order to achieve the desired end state in a future point in time (Kem 2012, 53). Figure 1 depicts the operational approach in a visual framework.

By depicting the operational approach in this manner, the relationships between current and future conditions, objectives, and the time frame estimated to do so becomes more understandable. This operational approach will not contain a comprehensive list of all tasks that must be accomplished, but will describe broad concepts (Kem 2012, 52).

Figure 5.   Operational Approach – Generic

Source: Derived from Jack D. Kem, *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012).

The ways in which tasks will be organized is along lines of effort. "A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions" (Department of the Army 2012, 4-5). The tasks will be grouped together using this logic of purpose and placed along lines of effort. This method is suitable and valuable when focusing efforts to establish operational and strategic conditions (Kem 2012, 158). Once the logic of purpose has been used to organize the lines of effort, tasks, called operational objectives will be placed along them (Kem 2012, 165).

Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation criteria are used for both military and civilian purposes because these can help establish if actions are suitable to achieve the desired results and "determine if

the course of action is the best course of action to accomplish the mission" (Kem 2012, 223). Table 1 depicts the set of criteria that will be applied to the study determining if the U.S. Army should take efforts to a "Little Increase," a "Moderate Increase" or a "Significant Increase" in mentoring black officers. Individually, each criterion will be addressed and then aggregated in chapter 4.

Table 1. Evaluation Criteria: Overview			
Question	Little Increase (1 point)	Moderate Increase (2 points)	Significant Increase (3 points)
1) How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?			
2) How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, and executable strategy?			
3) What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?			

Source: Developed by author.

The three evaluation criteria mirror the secondary research questions. These were chosen because, they help to establish the degree or effort required to increase the number of black combat arms officers. As part of the research design, each criterion is applied to the study and a judgment will be made as to where on the three part scale the increase falls: significant (three points), moderate (two points), or little (one point). After

aggregation, scores will be compiled, and the highest score indicates the best selection. Further discussion and analysis will be in chapter 4 as the research points to answering the primary research question.

<u>Research Methodology</u>

The following is the step-by-step approach for the research in this thesis:

Step 1: The first step in the research design is to conduct a literature review and answer the secondary research question of "How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?" The answer to this question will include an Operational Approach and the development of lines of effort.

Step 2: The second step in the research design is to develop the operational approach, including lines of effort, current conditions, and future conditions (or desired end state).

Step 3: The third step in the research design is to develop a framework of evaluation criteria to assist in determining the answer to the following secondary research question of "How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, executable strategy?"

Step 4: The fourth step in the research design is to apply the evaluation criteria in order to answer the secondary research question of "What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?"

Step 5: The fifth step in the research design is to aggregate the findings once the evaluation criteria have been applied. These findings, when combined with the operational approach, will answer the primary research question.

Step 6: Finally, the sixth and last step in the research design is to draw conclusions and make recommendations for future research.

Threats to Validity and Biases

Biases, also known as psychological traps, threaten the validity of this research. At the beginning of the study, the researcher has an idea where the research may go and what the outcomes and answers to the primary and secondary research questions might be. The confirming evidence trap influences the sources used for examination and the interpretations of the research, most likely subconsciously, causing more weight to be placed on evidence supporting the researcher's original thoughts (Garson 2016). By keeping these threats to validity and biases in mind, the researcher seeks to mitigate the negative effects on the study and on the conclusions drawn.

Chapter Conclusion

The goal of using this type of research methodology is to succinctly answer the primary research question given the threats to validity, biases, limitations, and delimitations. The next chapter, Chapter 4, contains an analysis of the data collected within this study.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

> Good Mentorship must exist throughout an officer's career to help guide officers to where they should serve in the Army, such as in what units, installations and jobs…we can do better at the role of mentoring, and at the role of coaching.
>
> — Major General Wilson A. Shoffner,
> U.S. Army Director, Talent Management Task Force

Chapter Introduction

This chapter compiles the data collected in answering the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" The literature review combined with the research methodology answers the secondary research questions, which leads to answering the primary research question. The data and analysis of the findings dictates using a step-wise approach as described in Chapter 3.

Step 1: Results of the Literature Review

The literature review answered the first secondary research question," How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?" African American officers have performed honorably in major American wars. Black officers viewed military service as an opportunity for economic, social, and political equality. Generation after generation, blacks have served in support units and over time garnered the perception that support units provided the best opportunity for employment in the civilian sector after military service. This perception permeated throughout the black community as black civic leaders emphasized employment rather

than long-term service. Support units offered the best advantage for civilian employment because of the technical skills acquired. Although, these skills seemed attractive in an industrial economy, black officers were failing to reach the senior levels of the Army because of their underrepresentation in the combat arms branches. An important aspect of officers reaching the senior levels involved mentorship throughout their career.

Different cultures can provide barriers to mentorship. Even the different services such as the Navy and Air Force view mentorship differently from the Army. Race presents another barrier within the Army. Black culture differs from white culture, which while similar possess varying characteristics that differ from Army culture. Organizational culture depends on a set of shared beliefs acceptable by the group. As an organization, the Army has juggled the idea of mentorship and what effective mentorship should entail. It has implemented several mentorship initiatives, but has yet to truly define good mentorship. In doctrine, the Army has defined mentorship as "the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect" (Department of the Army 2012, 7-67).

Mentorship, which can be formal or informal, bridges the gap between different cultures within an organization. Although the idea may seem straightforward, many officers interchange the term mentorship with coaching or counseling. This confusion produces unintended consequences and misconceptions especially in the Army. If African American officers are mentored effectively about combat arms, then theoretically, the numbers should increase over time as perceptions change.

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After answering the secondary research question in Step 1 of this chapter, Step 2 examines the operational approach and how it looks.

Step 2: Proposed Operational Approach

The second step in the research design involved developing an operational approach that included lines of effort, current conditions, and future conditions (or desired end state). Figure 6 represents this operational framework. On the left side of the figure, the current conditions describe the number of black combat arms officers and black noncombat arms officers as a percentage of the force in the U.S. Army. On the right side, the end state depicts the desired conditions of having eight percent African American combat arms officers at the end of ten years. The lines of effort outline the objectives, which shape the current conditions into the desired conditions. The tasks were organized into three categories titled "Build," "Train," and "Sustain." These actions formed the lines of effort (LOE) and supported the operational approach geared towards increasing the number of African American combat arms officers.

Figure 6.   Operational Approach

Source: Developed by author.

LOE 1- Build. Tasks that fall on this line of effort involve accessions and focus on building a cohort of black officers who have the option of branching combat arms. Current branching guidance for USMA dictates that 70 percent of cadets must branch combat arms. The majority of officers commission from ROTC, and because most black officers commission from HBCUs, the Army should modify the branching policy immediately to increase the number of combat arms positions available to ROTC cadets. Current guidance should breakdown the percentage to 60 percent USMA, 40 percent ROTC. Cadets at USMA and ROTC should match their talents to branches. Given the freedom to choose their branch based on talents enhances the influence of mentors and close family members. Senior influencers such as Congress, CASAs, and USAR Ambassadors can engage the black community and influence the number of African American officers to choose combat arms.

LOE 2- Train. Tasks that fall underneath this line of effort involve black officers after commissioning and branched into combat arms units. As officers gain operational experience, specific emphasis is placed on counseling past performance through officer evaluation reports, coaching present performance from immediate supervisors, and mentoring from senior officers outside the chain of command. All three are primary inputs to officer professional development. A second task is offering candid feedback on officer strengths and weaknesses while having two stay conversations at the fourth and sixth year of commissioned service. A third task during this line of effort is to implement exit surveys for those officers deciding to leave the service. Within the survey, questions related to mentorship should be highlighted and recorded for future use.

LOE 3- Sustain. This LOE supports a reinforcing loop and enables successful senior leaders to engage the black community and change the perspective of combat arms. The Army should increase engagement for selection to combat arms with a focus on strategic messaging, professional military education, and proponent engagements. A second task should be leveraging existing outreach programs that target black communities. A final task is leveraging successful senior minority combat arms officers as role models in service and civilian sectors to engage the black community.

Of the combat arms branches, the primary recruiting branch should include Field Artillery. These officers could visit community centers and churches, which can provide a venue for military mentors to engage underrepresented populations. Influencers such as family members, parents, and community leaders must be part of the process to consolidate gains in the African American community. Additionally, an operational team of active duty field grade officers could engage the community and shape perceptions

from the current force. Having both retired successful senior officers and current successful field grade officers reinforces the narrative that African American officers create value in the combat arms.

After analyzing the literature, Step 1 identified how mentorship plays a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches. In step 2, an operational framework outlined the general approach of increasing black officers in the combat arms branches. Next, the degree of effort will be examined by applying evaluation criteria.

Step 3: Development of Evaluation Criteria

The third step in the research design is to develop a framework of evaluation criteria to assist in establishing the degree of increase by assigning point value to three categories: significant increase (three points), moderate increase (two points), and little increase (one point). The scores will be totaled after aggregating the responses. The highest score indicates the optimal selection. This increase, combined with the answers to the secondary research questions, will lead to answering the primary research question.

Step 4: Application of Evaluation Criteria

The fourth step as part of the research design, is to apply a framework of evaluation criteria to help determine at what degree the Army should increase its mentoring efforts in order to increase African American officers in the combat arms branches. Each degree is assigned a point value based on a three-part scale. The increase can be significant (three points), moderate (two points), or little (one point). After aggregation, scores will be tallied, and the highest score indicates the best selection.

Shown below, each of the separate criteria will be answered and explained. Applying the

evaluation criteria to the answers of the secondary research questions will lead to

answering the primary research question.

Evaluation Criterion 1: Role of Mentorship

How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the

combat arms branches? Mentorship plays a significant role, not only in increasing the

number of African American officers, but in the Army as a whole. Table 2 depicts that

the Army should significantly increase its mentorship efforts if it wants to increase the

number of black combat arms officers. As a cornerstone to professional development, the

Army must improve it mentorship within its ranks.

According to the fiscal year 2015 Center for the Army Professional Ethic (CAPE)

Annual Survey of the Army Profession (CASAP), 65 percent of peers agreed that they

trusted their subordinates. Trust is built through education, operational experience, and

training (CAPE 2015). 64 percent of the Army agree that a mentor helps develop them as

a leader. The Army should increase efforts to increase opportunities for effective

mentorship and encourage lasting relationship through professional military education

(CAPE 2015). On the other hand, 82 percent of the Army agrees that they are mentoring

another Army professional. While some mentors may agree that they are providing

mentorship, the protégé may not recognize the interaction as mentorship (CAPE 2015).

Additionally, mentorship has a direct correlation with attrition. Most black officers

started their career without mentors and subsequently left the service due to lack of

motivation and career satisfaction (Reyes 2006, 9). In fiscal year 1999, the Army attrition

rate among captains increased from 9.6 percent to 10.6 percent. Subsequently, the Army

had difficulty in filling its active component requirements for captains due to the shortage (Harney 2000, 13). If mentoring is voluntary and based on mutual trust and respect, many service members are not receiving proper mentorship.

Table 2. Evaluation Criteria: Role of Mentorship			
Question	Little Increase (1 point)	Moderate Increase (2 points)	Significant Increase (3 points)
1) How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?			X

Source: Developed by author.

Evaluation Criterion 2: Diversity Efforts and Resources

How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, and executable strategy? Table 3 depicts that the Army should moderately increase its efforts to create a synchronized, executable strategy that focuses its diversity efforts and resources. The Army has taken numerous measures to increase its diversity efforts, however, it needs to focus the efforts in an efficient manner. Officers commissioned from USMA exit the service at a higher rate than officers commissioned from ROTC.

A study conducted at West Point revealed that 54 percent of officers commissioned from USMA exited the Army within eight years, and 46 percent of officers commissioned in 2001 left the service by 2006 (Livingston 2010, 19). 80 percent of USMA's commissioning class branches combat arms while 20 percent branch

noncombat arms. If after eight years, over half of the USMA class exits the service, this reduces the pool of combat arms officers. Compared to 10 percent of captains commissioned from ROTC that leave the service, the Army can modify the percentage of combat arms assignments given to USMA (Livingston 2010, 19).

The Army has proposed forced branching into combat arms for OCS cadets. This approach will not work for two reasons. First, officers will lack the motivation and commitment if forced into infantry, armor, or artillery branches. Performance in their duties will suffer because of a compliant attitude. Second, the majority of officers commissioned from OCS have prior enlisted service. OCS accessions provides a pool of officers to fill a shortfall. While this option supports the operating force's resource requirement in the short-term, it creates a shortage for the Army long-term (Dewitt 2010, 31).

Since OCS officers often have prior military service, the majority of them end up retiring and leaving the service before reaching the senior levels of the Army. This course of action is not sustainable and will not increase the numbers of black combat arms officers at the senior level. Mentorship at the company-grade level will influence officers to stay in the Army. Because mentoring programs already exist, the Army should moderately increase it efforts by refining these programs to focus on their gains.

Table 3. Evaluation Criteria: Diversity Efforts and Resources			
Question	Little Increase (1 point)	Moderate Increase (2 points)	Significant Increase (3 points)
2) How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, and executable strategy?		X	

Source: Developed by author.

Evaluation Criterion 3: Strategy to Increase Black Artillery Officers

What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers? If the Army wants to increase the number of African American officers, it must retain a higher percentage over a period of time. It must increase its pool of Black combat arms officers at the junior officer level and sustain those numbers over time. Only then will the pool of black officers be large enough to increase the numbers at the senior level. African American combat arms officers have a ten percent higher continuation rate than the Army average. Figure 7 depicts this data over a ten-year period. However, if not given proper guidance and mentorship in operational assignments, black officers seek other alternatives outside of the military.

ACC Officer Continuation Rate by Race Category

	YR00	YR01	YR02	YR03	YR04	YR05	YR06	YR07	YR08	YR09	YR10
Asian/Pac Isl.	100%	98.8%	95.8%	87.4%	76.7%	60.6%	54.3%	52.4%	49.0%	46.2%	42.4%
Caucasian	100%	98.8%	97.0%	89.7%	77.5%	61.4%	56.1%	53.0%	50.0%	46.6%	43.4%
Hispanic	100%	98.7%	97.4%	92.4%	80.8%	67.5%	61.0%	56.9%	53.0%	49.5%	47.1%
African American	100%	97.8%	94.6%	88.0%	79.8%	69.9%	65.4%	63.1%	61.6%	57.4%	51.5%
Other	100%	98.7%	97.0%	82.4%	71.2%	57.9%	52.8%	51.5%	48.5%	45.1%	42.9%
– – Grand Total	100%	98.7%	96.8%	89.4%	77.7%	62.3%	57.0%	54.0%	51.0%	47.6%	44.2%

Figure 7.   ACC Officer Continuation Rate by Race Category

Source: U. S. Army Human Resources Command, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, Operations and Plans Division, 2017.

The Army should seek ways to economically empower the combat arms branches. The key is to translate the earning potential of being an infantryman, artilleryman, or cavalryman to the black community. As Eugene Robinson describes in his book, *Disintegration: The Splintering of Black America*, the Army should target two black groups: the Transcendents and the Mainstream. The transcendents are black elite who have enormous wealth, while the mainstream middle class majority are black professionals (Robinson 2010, 5). Both of these socioeconomic groups have the ability to influence the African American community at large.

Increasing the numbers at the pre-commissioning level begins with a deliberate effort to engage strategic areas such as Maryland and California. Prince George's County, Maryland is home to five of the top ten cities where the wealthiest blacks reside in

America. Windsor Hills, Baldwin Hills, and Ladera Heights are three places in California that top the list of wealthiest communities where blacks live in the U.S. (Washington Post 2015). The Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO) can recruit in these areas and influence wealthy and middle class blacks to join the combat arms ranks. FAPO can emphasize that Field Artillery is combat arms, but not directly involved with the close fight. Leaders can also discuss how artillery enhances management and leadership skills as Field Artillery integrates with both maneuver and support. Field Artilleryman are excellent communicators and have integrated women into its combat formations.

The Army should engage civic leaders such as the Congressional Black Caucus and address actions to increase their nominations to USMA. In 2013, members of Congress had over 5,300 nominations of which 200 were African American (Clark 2014, 29). The Congressional Black Caucus should increase their efforts in finding qualified candidates to apply for admission to USMA. Of their 700 available nominations, the Congressional Black Caucus nominated only 42 African American candidates (Clark 2014, 29).

Even though blacks leave the service thinking they have a competitive advantage over others because of the skills acquired while in the military, studies have shown that they are no better off. According to the National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics report, minority veterans have a 44 percent higher risk of unemployment than non-minority veterans, and 34 percent are employed in the government sector at the federal, state, and local level (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics 2017). Creating value and building self-esteem will influence African American officers to remain in the combat arms branches. Several programs exist in the Army as initiatives to

increasing the number of black officers, so only a moderate increase can be established

for this evaluation criterion.

Table 4. Evaluation Criteria: Strategy to Increase Black Artillery Officers			
Question	Little Increase (1 point)	Moderate Increase (2 points)	Significant Increase (3 points)
3) What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?		X	

Source: Developed by author.

Step 5: Aggregation of Data and Answer to Primary Research Question

Step 5: After having applied the evaluation criteria, the fifth step in the research

design is to aggregate and present the findings. Table 5 depicts the aggregated findings.

Applying the evaluation criteria establishes that the Army should moderately increase its

mentoring efforts to grow the number of black combat arms officers. While the Army

does not need to significantly increase its efforts, it still must reexamine how mentoring

occurs throughout the Army, and set the conditions appropriately if it desires to increase

the number of African American combat arms officers. This data and analysis

subsequently leads to answering the primary research question.

Table 5. Evaluation Criteria - Aggregate			
Question	Little Increase (1 point)	Moderate Increase (2 points)	Significant Increase (3 points)
1) How does mentorship play a role in increasing the number of black officers in the combat arms branches?			**X**
2) How can the U.S. Army increase its diversity efforts and what resources are available to implement a comprehensive, synchronized, and executable strategy?		**X**	
3) What is the best strategy to increasing the number of black artillery officers?		**X**	
Total	0	4	3

Source: Developed by author.

Chapter Conclusion

Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery? The answer to the primary research question is yes. Analysis of the literature identifies mentorship as the critical ingredient to increasing the number of black combat arms officers. Without it, African American officers see no value in remaining in the service and leave the Army between the sixth and eighth year of commissioned service. After applying the evaluation criteria, the Army should moderately increase its mentoring efforts, but it must be synchronized and aligned along multiple fronts. Mentorship occurs prior to commissioning, during service, and post-service from selected senior minority leaders to consolidate gains.

Finally, the sixth and last step in the research design is to draw conclusions, make recommendations for decision makers, and propose options for future research. This is found in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> Diversity in race, gender and even social and economic background bring value to the Army because diverse teams of people produce better outcomes. And as the demographics of the United States change, so too must the Army.
> — Patrick J. Murphy, Under Secretary of the Army

Chapter Introduction

After careful analysis, the answer to the primary research question, "Should the U.S. Army increase its mentoring efforts over the next 10 years in order to grow black combat arms officers predominantly in the Field Artillery?" is yes. After reviewing the literature, developing an operational approach, and analyzing data, the Army must re-examine its mentorship efforts. It must be synchronized across all lines of effort, but more importantly, transcend racial and gender boundaries. The operational environment has changed to where the old adage of a mentor must "look like you" is obsolete.

Conclusions

Scholars and Senior Army leaders recognize that African American combat arms officers are underrepresented. Based on the low numbers, it is too much of a challenge to increase black officer enrollment in the combat arms through existing African American combat arms senior leaders. This disparity argues for the benefit and critical concept of cross race mentoring. To increase the number of black combat arms officers, senior white officers must mentor junior black officers on Army culture. The Army has addressed numerous shortfalls through enhancing the intellectual capital of USMA and ROTC cadets, but should improve the social capital of officers (Mitchell 2008, 19). Combining

individual capital with social capital creates the necessary conditions for perceptual change, which starts in the community.

There are also two other conclusions that can be drawn from the study: the use of ROCKS and the use of Strategic Communications.

Rocks as an Engagement Approach

The Army can use ROCKS as an intermediary with engaging the African American community. This organization has close ties with retired black senior officers and can enforce civilian outreach through it numerous connections and networks. With its headquarters located in Washington, DC, ROCKS can engage political leaders such as members of the Congressional Black Caucus and Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army. Linking these leaders with ROCKS can synchronize efforts to change the general perception of black officers serving in the combat arms.

Strategic Communication Plan

A strong economy creates more options for jobs and education. The Army must increase its incentives that target specific challenges pertinent to the black community. The Army can leverage Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army through engagement with the African American community. By investing in society, especially the black community, the Army can sow the seeds to grow a pipeline of African American combat arms officers. If not, private business organizations will attract talented officers from the service in search of better economic opportunities.

Recommendations for Decision Makers

Mentorship benefits the Army as an institution. While its effectiveness can increase the number of African American combat arms officers, it also overcomes Army warfighting challenge number nine by improving Soldier, Leader and Team performance in all Army organizations. Mentorship has a positive impact on the total Army and should be sequential over the life cycle of an officer's career. In light of the findings, Army senior leaders should implement three recommendations by modifying the combat arms distribution, formalizing a mentorship program within ROTC, and strategically engaging the black community.

First, the Army must modify its branching and accession policy. If the Army wants to build effective teams, it must recruit, assess, and develop individuals differently. The Army should redistribute its combat arms requirements. USMA should retain 60 percent of the combat arms requirements, while ROTC fills the remaining 40 percent.

Second, the Army should implement a formalized mentorship program in ROTC that integrates professional development, guidance, and coaching before cadets commission into the Army. ROTC is the critical time where there is an opportunity to influence the attitudes of young cadets (Butler 1996, 22). The Army has several formal and informal programs at USMA, but no such programs exists within ROTC.

Currently, U.S. Army Cadet Command contracts civilians to serve as Assistant Professors of Military Science. While continuing dedicated service to their country, these civilians do not serve as mentors for the cadets in ROTC programs. Cadets more often choose their Professor of Military Science or Senior Noncommissioned officer as a mentor vice a civilian contractor for career advice (Miller 2011, 33).

Additionally, uniformed service members influenced cadet branching choices prior to commissioning. Cadet command allows ROTC cadets to choose their branch based on knowledge, skills, and talents. In other words, these potential Army officers select their branch based on personal attributes. As ROTC and USMA continue to utilize a matching based methodology for cadet branch selection, a combat arms mentor could reinforce the value and benefit of choosing combat arms especially among minority cadets.

Assigning high-potential African American officers to HBCUs will have limited results on increasing black combat arms officers. Operational requirements limit the number of officers competitive for battalion command to serve as Professors of Military Science with ROTC programs. Duty within the institutional army as an assistant professor of military science is considered lower in priority compared to duty as an aide de camp, executive officer, or observer controller for high potential post-command captains and post-KD majors.

Third, different cultures exist within American society. The Army must be able to communicate effectively to the black community and address some of their concerns as it relates to socioeconomic progress. Even though the Army was the first military service to desegregate its units, a negative stigma exists among the black community in regards to service as a combat arms officer. History and limited awareness has influenced black officers to favor noncombat arms. Movies such as *Boys in the Hood* describe the Army as no place for a Black man. The narrative suggests that the risk is too high to serve in combat arms especially when the expectation is short-term service. Changing the narrative can only occur if young black men see successful black combat arms officers.

The lack of pictures and biographies of African American combat arms officers succeeding in the civilian sector reinforces the narrative.

Building relationships with black leaders will increase the social capital within the black community. The Army has an opportunity to reinvent the structural barriers within the black community and increase the social capital of black Americans. Addressing topics identified in the State of Black America (SOBA) report could shape how the African American community views the Army. The narrative of hard work enabling success is false. Instead, the counter-narrative should focus on the support system and structure that sets the conditions for success and opportunity. In places like Chicago, the public has been inundated with negative stereotypes of young African American men being uneducated, violent, and unmotivated. Value in individuals begins with encouragement and motivation.

<center>Recommendations for Future Research</center>

This study did not use formal interviews or surveys due to time constraints and the restrictive nature concerning human subjects. Surveys or interviews concerning minority service in combat arms branches would provide insight for senior leaders as to why there is a lack of black combat arms officers and analyze the perceptions of military culture from a scientific perspective. The study would enable senior leaders to understand how different races view military life and culture especially in the combat arms world.

Additionally, a future study should analyze how mentorship impacts minority officers at the lieutenant colonel and above level. The research project could highlight if minority officers are being mentored, the number of mentors minority officers have, and how are they being mentored to develop future African American officers. This study

should include an analysis of the attrition rate for black officers at the lieutenant colonel and above level. Such a study would inform senior Army leaders on the most effective ways to build strategic depth and sustain the number of minority officers in the combat arms branches.

<center>Parting Thoughts</center>

Mentoring is important to leader development and career progression, for it contributes to culture adaptation, competence, confidence, upward mobility, and decisions to stay in the Army. Mentoring should occur early in an officer's career before the first assignment. Cultural misunderstandings limit the mentoring process by creating a barrier for developing trust between the mentor and protégé. Often, this barrier is too difficult to overcome and results in officers leaving the Army after their initial assignment.

To be successful, an Army officer must demonstrate leadership competencies and technical knowledge. Otherwise, they will not advance through the ranks. The journey, however, is not experienced alone. Reaching the senior levels of any organization requires a vital ingredient, mentorship. Organizations such as the Army with its internal promotion system, has to develop leaders that will sustain the organization for the future. In other words, senior leaders must recognize potential and identify those future senior leaders. Understanding cultures and experiences promotes diversity. African Americans have distinct experiences that differ from White Americans. These experiences have shaped perceptions and attitudes throughout the black community. The Army serves the American people and derives its greatest strength from them. Everyone exhibits value,

whether it is thought or experience. Mentorship provides the bridge to where diversity of thought and experience can cross racial and gender boundaries.

Effective mentoring does not occur in a vacuum. Both mentor and protégé must take the time to cultivate the relationship otherwise it will fizzle. The Army needs leaders who are effective mentors. It is pertinent for leader development and enables the Army to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. As security challenges increase in the operational environment, the Army must meet these challenges by developing leaders who have the ability to operate across many cultural boundaries and domains. Success will occur when analysis and interpretation coalesce information into new ideas with lifelong learning as the standard. Through mentorship and moral courage, the Army can build and develop its future leaders. The American people expect the Army to leverage the talents of all its people, and nothing less to accomplish its mission.

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